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Introduction and summary
What happens to people’s assets in the period imme-
diately preceding their death? This is an important 
question for a number of reasons. To begin with, the 
elderly have a lot of wealth—households whose heads 
are 65 or older account for more than one-third of  
U.S. household wealth1—and the way in which they 
manage all this wealth may depend critically on end-
of-life events. If, for example, elderly people are afraid 
of incurring large medical expenses just before they 
die, they might keep large amounts of assets even in 
very old age and not run down their assets until their 
illnesses appear terminal. Moreover, the need to pay 
for end-of-life expenses should affect the amount of 
wealth that younger households accumulate to fund 
their retirement. The issue of whether working house-
holds are saving enough has raised enough debate to 
warrant its own chapter in the current Economic Re-
port of the President. This debate cannot be resolved 
until we learn the magnitude of end-of-life expenses.
In this article, we use data from the Asset and 
Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), collect-
ed by scholars at the University of Michigan, to track 
the assets and expenses of elderly households in their 
last years of life. We find that the assets of people who 
die decline much faster than the assets of people who 
survive, even after controlling for age, sex, and initial 
asset levels. For single-person households, average 
wealth declines by 30 percent in the year preceding 
death and by 50 percent in the three years preceding 
death. The assets of single survivors with characteris-
tics similar to those of the deceased, on the other 
hand, are flat over the same period.
Our main finding is that death is often preceded 
by a costly illness. Out-of-pocket medical expendi-
tures related to drug costs, doctor visits, and hospital 
and nursing home stays go up by about 200 percent in   
the few years before death. The increase in medical 
spending before death, combined with burial expenses, 
can explain about 24 percent of the decline in assets 
of the soon-to-be deceased and about 37 percent of 
the decline in assets in the last year of life. In short, 
out-of-pocket medical expenses right before death can 
deplete the assets of many elderly households and 
constitute an important reason to keep assets in old 
age. Our findings also suggest that even if government 
insurance and transfer programs, such as Medicare, 
Medicaid, or Supplemental Security Income, are 
shielding the elderly from medical expenses, the  
coverage is far from complete.
Related literature and contributions  
of our article
The principal model that economists use to un-
derstand saving and to project how policy changes—
such as changes in social security or Medicare—will 
affect saving is the life-cycle model.2 The life-cycle 
model assumes that people are forward-looking and 
base their consumption and saving decisions on their 
preferences for consumption and knowledge of their 
future income. In the simplest version of the model, 
individuals know with perfect certainty the age at which 
they will die, and they place no value on leaving be-
quests to their children. Under this framework, indi-
viduals choose to die with no wealth: An individual 
in the last period of life, knowing that he is going to die 
and receiving no utility from bequests, forgoes utility 
if he does not consume all of his remaining wealth. 3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
This simple version of the life-cycle model, how-
ever, is at odds with a large body of empirical research 
showing that many households retain large amounts 
of assets even in very old age (see Hurd, 1990, for a 
review). There are several reasons why a simple life- 
cycle model might underpredict saving by the elderly. 
First, people are usually uncertain about the exact 
time of their death and might need to save against the 
possibility of a long life. Second, people might save 
in order to bequeath assets to their children. Third, 
people might retain assets in case they need to pay  
for large out-of-pocket medical expenses.3
In this article, we consider another possibility, 
namely, that the data are incomplete. Although the age 
profile of assets has been carefully documented, we 
are among the first to document the changes in assets 
and medical expenditures that occur immediately be-
fore death. This is extremely important because many 
studies do not include people that are just about to die. 
For example, people in nursing homes are not included 
in the core sample of the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF), although they are included in the high wealth 
oversample. If high medical expenses incurred from 
nursing home visits cause assets to decline before death, 
this will be completely missed in any study that uses 
SCF data. The predictions of the life-cycle model re-
fer to what happens immediately before death: We are 
constructing a more precise test of the theory.
In addition, by studying the medical expenditures 
that are incurred right before death, we can develop  
a better measure of how much medical expense risk 
households face. This helps us better understand the 
importance of precautionary motives. Finally, our anal-
ysis helps us evaluate the risk of poverty immediately 
before death, an issue of major policy relevance. 
Our work in this article is arguably most related 
to work by Hurd and Smith (2001), Yun (2003), and 
Hoover et al. (2004). Hurd and Smith find that assets 
decline very little at death, but base their comparison 
on the 1993 wave of the AHEAD, for which assets 
appear to be underreported much more severely than 
in other waves. Yun uses AHEAD data to consider 
how “expecting death” affects asset growth and, like 
us, finds that people run down their assets as they ap-
proach death. Using the Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey, Hoover et al. find that medical expenditures 
rise dramatically in the final year of life.
Data
We use data from the Asset and Health Dynamics 
Among the Oldest Old data set. The AHEAD is a survey 
of individuals who in 1993 were both noninstitution-
alized and aged 70 or older. A total of 8,222 individuals 
in 6,047 households were interviewed for the first 
wave in 1993. These individuals were interviewed 
again in 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002. The AHEAD 
data include a nationally representative core sample, 
as well as additional samples of blacks, Hispanics, 
and Florida residents.
The AHEAD has comprehensive asset measures. 
It has information on the value of housing and real 
estate, autos, liquid assets (which include money mar-
ket accounts, savings accounts, and Treasury bills), 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs), Keogh plans, 
stocks, the value of farms or businesses, mutual funds, 
bonds, and “other” assets and investment trusts. Our 
measure of wealth is the sum of all these assets, less 
mortgages and other debts. Following common prac-
tice (for example, Hurd, 1989; and Attanasio and 
Hoynes, 2000), we exclude pension and social security 
wealth. Because assets appear to be significantly un-
derreported in the first wave (see Rohwedder, Haider, 
and Hurd, 2004), we begin our analysis with data 
from wave two (the 1995 wave).
Given their age, many members of the sample die 
over the sample period. A novel feature of the AHEAD 
data is that survivors of the deceased (usually either a 
surviving spouse or a child) are interviewed. Survivors 
are asked about the value of the estate, insurance pay-
ments, medical expenses immediately preceding death, 
and costs associated with death, such as burial expens-
es. The key variable is the value of the estate. The ex-
act question asked of the survivors of the deceased 
varied year to year, but in most years they were asked: 
“Altogether, what was the value of (his/her) total es-
tate?” How the survivors of the deceased interpret this 
question is unclear. However, in appendix A, we show 
that, at least for the children of the deceased, the most 
likely interpretation of the question is the total value 
of the estate, inclusive of all possessions, such as the 
house and other valuables. If one member of the house-
hold dies but the other survives, we do not use the re-
sponse to the estate question, but instead use the 
survivor’s responses to the usual asset questionnaire. 
There are several problems with our asset data. 
The first is that the wealthy tend to underreport their 
wealth in virtually every household survey (Davies 
and Shorrocks, 2000). This leads us to understate  
asset levels at all ages. However, Juster, Smith, and 
Stafford (1999) show that the wealth distribution of 
the AHEAD matches up well with aggregate values 
for all but the richest 1 percent of households. A sec-
ond problem with our data is that it spans the years 
1995 to 2002, a period in which there was a rapid rise 
in asset prices. This makes it difficult for us to distin-
guish between intended asset growth due to active  3Q/006, Economic Perspectives
TaBlE 1
Household wealth, by asset type and year
	 1995  1998  2000  2002
Housing	 75,391	 77,051	 84,256	 84,183
Liquid	assets	 52,078	 47,236	 48,081	 61,021
Stocks	 49,946	 52,675	 50,387	 43,619
Automobiles	 4,778	 5,148	 4,804	 4,550
Businesses	 12,057	 8,916	 8,480	 17,183
Individual	retirement
		accounts	 7,558	 9,013	 11,312	 7,963
Other	assets	 3,278	 5,553	 4,606	 3,525
Debt	 2,456	 2,649	 2,501	 3,052
Total	assets	 202,630	 202,943	 209,425	 218,992
Observations	 3,880	 3,303	 2,777	 2,312
Notes:	Table	does	not	include	the	value	of	estates.	All	values	are	in	1998	dollars.	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Asset and Health Dynamics  
of the Oldest Old.	
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saving and unintended asset growth due 
to unexpectedly high returns. 
Our data also suffer from attrition—
people leaving the sample over time— 
a problem common to all panel data sets. 
In the AHEAD, attrition is largely due to 
death: Reported deaths are confirmed us-
ing the National Death Index. However, 
in some cases, interviewers are unable to 
track down sample members as they move 
from house to house, and some individu-
als refuse to give follow-up interviews. If 
the people who are difficult to contact 
differ systematically from those we are 
able to keep track of, “nondeath” attrition 
could distort the composition of our sam-
ple. If, for example, it is more difficult to 
track down poor individuals, poor house-
holds will be dropped from the sample at 
greater rates than the rich ones. 
Two additional problems arise from the fact that 
assets are a household-level rather than an individual-
level variable. First, some of the households in our 
sample consist of two unmarried individuals. Because 
it is not clear how these respondents might answer the 
asset questions, we drop these households. Second, 
many sample members get married or divorced over 
the sample period. Therefore, changes in wealth over 
time reflect not only savings decisions (the object of 
interest in this study), but also household formation 
decisions. To counter this problem, we drop individu-
als who get married or divorced during the sample 
period. To sum up, we keep only those households 
that were either married or single living alone in wave 
one and that changed household structure only because 
of death.4
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of our 
sample and reports average asset holdings by wave. 
(Assets are measured in 1998 dollars and do not in-
clude the value of any estates.) Our analysis begins 
with 3,880 households in 1995, of which 2,312 have 
at least one surviving member in 2002. Housing is  
the largest component of our households’ portfolios, 
but liquid assets (such as bonds) and stocks are also 
important. 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the demographic tran-
sitions in our sample by showing how household com-
position changes between 1995 and 2002. Table 2 
shows that of the 501 single men alive in 1995, 62 
percent (309) had died by 2002. Of the single women, 
48 percent were dead in 2002. Table 3 shows that of 
the 1,165 married couples that were alive in 1995, 32 
percent had just the male die, 11 percent had just the 
female die, and 18 percent had both members die dur-
ing the sample period. 
Table 4 shows starting and ending wealth, by 
1995 and 2002 household structure, for people who 
were initially single. The leftmost column in table 4  
shows 1995 and 2002 wealth for men who did not  
die during the sample period. The second column of 
table 4 shows wealth in 1995 and wealth at the time 
of death for men who did die between 1995 and 2002. 
Table 4 displays two measures of wealth at the time 
of death. The first measure (“excluding estates”) is  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TaBlE 
Singles’ characteristics, by demographic status in 1995 and 2002 
  Single male in 1995  Single female in 1995  All singles in 1995
  Single    Single     
2002 household structure  male  Dead  female  Dead  Single  Dead
1995	assets	 202,035	 219,675	 159,197	 126,454	 165,276	 147,603
Final	assets,	excluding	estates	 226,228	 210,740	 156,258	 107,634	 166,187	 131,026
Final	assets,	including	estates	 226,228	 110,380	 156,258	 98,732	 166,187	 101,374
Death	expenses	 	 5,779	 	 4,590	 	 4,860
Death	insurance	payouts	 	 422	 	 528	 	 504
Life	insurance	payouts	 	 2,857	 	 1,312	 	 1,663
Observations	 192	 309	 1,161	 1,053	 1,353	 1,362
Notes:	Assets	in	the	final	period	refer	to	assets	in	2002	if	the	household	survived	to	2002;	otherwise,	excluding	estate	value	means	excluding	assets	
in	the	final	period	before	death.	Assets	are	in	1998	dollars.	Observations	refer	to	the	number	of	observations	that	made	the	demographic	transition.	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old.	
TaBlE 
Married couples’ characteristics, by demographic status
in 1995 and 2002
  Married in 1995 
    Single  Single   
2002 household structure  Married  male  female  Dead 
1995	assets	 345,878	 252,879	 220,426	 268,196
Final	assets,	
		excluding	estates	 341,733	 232,266	 194,218	 212,435
Final	assets,	
		including	estates	 341,733	 232,266	 194,218	 224,801
Death	expenses	 	 4,897	 4,403	 8,031
Death	insurance	payouts	 	 369	 359	 731
Life	insurance	payouts	 	 2,773	 5,418	 2,999





Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Asset and Health Dynamics  
of the Oldest Old.	
the wealth reported for the last year the person is alive. 
The second measure (“including estates”) replaces, 
when possible, the previous measure of wealth with the 
value of the estate reported by the person’s survivors. 
The third and fourth columns show the corresponding 
statistics for single women. Both sets of columns in-
dicate that assets decline much more quickly for the 
deceased than for the survivors. Table 5 shows the 
same data for households that initially consisted of 
married couples. Table 5 also suggests that death is 
associated with a faster rate of asset decline.
Empirical methodology
In considering how assets behave immediately 
before death, it is useful to work with the asset accu-
mulation equation:
1)  A(it + 1) = (1 + r) A(it) + y(it)   
  – m(it) – e(it) – c(it),
where A(it) denotes assets of individual  
i at time t, r denotes the interest rate, y(it) 
denotes income (from social security, 
pensions, and so on), m(it) denotes medi-
cal expenses, e(it) denotes end-of-life ex-
penses (burial fees, less insurance pay-
outs), and c(it) denotes consumption. In 
short, assets can fall at the end of life be-
cause consumption rises, medical expen-
ditures rise, income falls, or end-of-life 
expenses are high.5 
While we have good measures of 
A(it), r, y(it), m(it), and e(it), we do not 
have a good measure of consumption, 
c(it). The consumption measures con-
tained in the AHEAD are very poor, and 
moreover, it is always difficult to measure 
the service flow from housing and durables. Fortu-
nately, we can use equation 1 to infer consumption:
2)  c(it) = [(1 + r) A(it) – A(it + 1)] + y(it)  
  – m(it) – e(it).
Appendix B contains a detailed description of 
our consumption inference procedure. In interpreting 
this measure of consumption, it is important to note 
that we do not measure some key variables, such as 
inter vivos (nonbequest) transfers between parents 
and children. The measure of consumption given by 
equation 2 should thus be interpreted as the sum of 
consumption and any expenditure not assigned to 
medical or end-of-life expenses. 6 3Q/006, Economic Perspectives
In practice, all of the variables in equations 1 and 
2 are measured with error. Therefore, even if the asset 
accumulation equation holds, its measured counterpart 
will not. As a matter of notation, we will use an aster-
isk to denote measured values, so A(it)* is the mea-
sured value of the asset level A(it). 
Our goal is to identify how assets and expendi-
tures change immediately before death. The principal 
econometric problem we face in making this compar-
ison is that people who die earlier might differ system-
atically from people who die later along a large number 
of (nondeath) dimensions. For example, poor people 
tend to die at younger ages than rich people (Shorrocks, 
1975; and Attanasio and Emmerson, 2003). This 
means that people who have died in our sample might 
have lower assets than people who lived, not because 
they have run down their wealth in their final years of 
life, but simply because they were poorer all along.6
To deal with this problem while keeping our 
methodology simple and intuitive, we use a two-step 
approach. In step one, we collect the people in the 
AHEAD who die either between 1995 and 1998 or 
between 1998 and 2000. We then estimate fixed ef-
fects regressions on this group, using the methodolo-
gy explained next.
In step two, we construct an artificial sample of 
people who have similar characteristics to those in 
step one described previously, but did not die be-
tween 1995 and 2000. For every household that did 
die during the sample period, and thus belongs in the 
sample described in step one, we find a household in 
the AHEAD that has the same age, the same 1995 
composition (that is, for every single female who 
died, we find a single female who did not die), and  
a similar 1995 asset level. Next, we pretend that each 
of these matched survivors “died” at the same date as 
their counterparts who actually did not survive. If an 
individual in step one dies in 1998, we assign the com-
parison individual who did not die a fictitious time of 
death in 1998. We then repeat the fixed effects regres-
sions described next with the sample of comparison 
individuals. 
We then compare the various profiles of the peo-
ple in these two groups by plotting the average fixed 
effect of each group and using the estimated coeffi-
cients from the fixed effects regressions. Since the 
households in the comparison group (who did not die) 
had the same age, sex, and 1995 wealth level as the 
household heads who did die, and since they faced 
the same aggregate environment, the wealth trajecto-
ries of the two groups arguably should differ only  
because of the event of death.
Our fixed effects regressions are computed as 
follows. Consider, for example, the regression for the 
assets of a single-person household:  
3)  A(it)* =  f(i) + a0 × 1{died between time t – 1 
     and t} + a1 × 1{died between time t 
    and t + 1} + e(it),
where f(i) is a constant that varies across households 
but not across time and a0 and a1 are the parameters 
we wish to estimate. The 1{.} function is the 0–1 in-
dicator function that returns 1 when the argument is 
true, so that 1{died between time t – 1 and t} equals  
1 if the individual died between time t – 1 and t, and 
equals 0 otherwise. (Since everybody in these exer-
cises has a real or fictitious death, the omitted catego-
ry is whether the individual dies between time t + 1 
and time t + 2.) Thus, if the individual dies between 
1998 and 2000, 
4)  1{died between time t – 1 and t} = 1 in 2000  
  and  0 in all other periods, and  
  1{died between time t and t + 1} = 1 in 1998  
  and 0 in all other periods.
Because the fixed effect f(i) varies by household, 
it will capture systematic differences between people 
who die earlier and people who die later; put differ-
ently, the terms a0 and a1 capture the way in which 
dying causes assets to differ from their household-
level average. The fixed effect term f(i) is thus poten-
tially correlated with the death indicators, although, 
by assumption, e(it) is not. 
Even though assets are measured with error—
equation 3 uses A(it)* rather than A(it)—as long as 
the measurement error has a zero mean, and is uncor-
related with the fixed effects and the death indicators, 
the coefficients a0 and a1 will consistently estimate the 
way in which assets change immediately before death.
Asset rundown right before death: How 
important is it and why does it happen?
In this section, we document asset rundown right 
before death. We also document some of the possible 
reasons for this, such as high medical and death 
expenses.
Figure 1 presents average assets for our two 
groups of people. The first group consists of single 
people who died either between the 1995 and 1998 
waves or between the 1998 and 2000 waves. (We 
consider only single-person households in order to 
simplify the interpretation of our results.) For the 
members of this group, we plot the average estate   Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FiguRE 1
Assets, those who die vs.
those who do not
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	




Annual medical costs, those who die vs.
those who do not
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	


















Those who do not die
Those who die
For this group, assets decline from $121,000 at time 
T – 2 to $118,000 at time T. 
The end-of-life wealth declines shown in figure 1 
are much larger than those reported in Hurd and 
Smith (2001), who use 1993 AHEAD asset data and 
1995 estate data for those who die between 1993 and 
1995. Hurd and Smith find that assets only decline from 
$82,000 to $81,600. We find similar declines when com-
paring 1993 asset data with 1995 estates. As we noted 
previously, however, the 1993 asset measures are like-
ly understated. This means that the asset declines be-
tween 1993 and 1995 are likely understated as well.  
There are several reasons why assets might de-
cline in the period preceding death. Perhaps the most 
obvious explanation is that medical expenses are high 
right before death. Figure 2 shows medical expenses 
before death for the same two groups of people, calcu-
lated with the same methodology used for assets. The 
vertical axis shows total out-of-pocket medical expen-
ditures—the sum of insurance premiums and payments 
for drugs, doctor visits, and hospital and nursing home 
stays that were not covered by insurance. Figure 2 
shows that for those who die, medical expenses rise 
rapidly before death. At time T – 2, medical expenses 
are $2,800 per year; at time T – 1, they rise to $3,300; 
and at time T (that is, the year before death), they are 
$7,400. The difference in medical costs between time 
T – 2 and time T – 1 is not statistically significant, but 
and average assets one and two waves before they 
die. We derive these averages from the regression de-
scribed previously, which contains a person-specific 
fixed effect and indicators for periods before death. We 
construct average assets, using the regression estimates 
and the average fixed effect for that group. On the 
vertical axis are asset levels. On the horizontal axis 
are waves before death, so that T is the time of death, 
T – 1 is one wave before the time of death, and T – 2 
is two waves before death. Recall that waves in the 
AHEAD data are two or three years apart. Thus, the 
time difference between T – 1 and T can be anywhere 
from zero to three years, and the time difference be-
tween T – 2 and T can be anywhere from two to five 
years. The second group consists of comparable sin-
gle people who did not die during the sample period.
Figure 1 shows that average assets of the soon-to-
be deceased are $126,000 two periods before death, 
$86,000 one period before death, and $59,000 at the 
time of death. Thus, in the few years before death, 
average assets decline over 50 percent, and in the pe-
riod just prior to death, they decline about 30 percent. 
These declines are statistically significant, with t-sta-
tistics of 2.3 for the difference in wealth between time 
T – 2 and time T – 1 and 3.8 for the difference in wealth 
between time T – 2 and T. In contrast, individuals in 
the comparison group, who are similar in age, sex, 
and 1995 wealth, show relatively small asset declines.  3Q/006, Economic Perspectives
FiguRE 3
Annual household income, those who die vs.
those who do not
Note:	Data	for	time	T	are	not	yet	available.
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from	










Those who do not die
Those who die
the difference between time T – 2 and time T is highly 
significant, with a t-statistic of 5.9. For the comparison 
group (with the same 1995 age, sex, and asset level), 
medical expenses remain roughly constant, and aver-
age $1,900 per year at time T – 2, $500 at time T – 1, 
and $1,000 at time T. The end-of-life increase in medi-
cal expenses shown in figure 2 is slightly higher than 
that found by Hoover et al. (2004), who estimate medi-
cal expenditure in the year before death using the Medi-
care Current Beneficiary Survey. 
Note that in addition to affecting wealth directly, 
medical expenses can also affect wealth indirectly over 
the entire life cycle if people save to pay for future 
medical expenses. This preemptive effect might be es-
pecially important if people save to insure themselves 
against catastrophic medical expenses, as suggested 
by Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994), Palumbo 
(1999), and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006).  
Figure 3 shows income, both for those who die 
and those who do not. Although we do not have good 
income data for time T, we do have good data for the 
two preceding waves (T – 1 and T – 2). Figure 3 
shows that income for those who die and for those 
who do not is similar across both of these waves. Re-
ported income falls modestly from about $11,500 to 
around $10,800 between time T – 2 and time T – 1 for 
those who do not die, and it remains roughly constant 
at approximately $10,900 for those who do die. 
There are also several expenses associated with 
death, such as burial expenses. Average burial expenses 
for our sample are about $4,900. Part of these expenses 
are covered by “death insurance,” small insurance 
policies designed to pay for burial expenses. These 
death insurance payments average a mere $500. 
The measure of estates used in our analysis does 
not include the value of life insurance payments. The 
asset trajectories shown in figure 1 thus understate the 
estate actually received by the household’s heirs. As 
it turns out, however, life insurance payouts are small, 
with an average value of $2,700. 
Our findings suggest that much of the rundown 
in assets just before death can be attributed to medical 
costs and other end-of-life expenses. To give a sense 
of magnitude, recall that figure 1 shows that assets 
decline by $27,000 in the period just before death, and 
$67,000 in the two periods preceding death. Figure 2 
shows that relative to the comparison group, the an-
nual medical expenses of people who die are about 
$6,000 higher in the last year of life (our estimated 
gap between T – 1 and T) and about $3,000 higher in 
the preceding two years (our estimated gap between  
T – 2 and T – 1). If death expenses (net of burial in-
surance) are about $4,000, it is then the case that 
about 37 percent (10/27) of the asset decline in the 
last year of life and 24 percent (16/67) of the total 
end-of-life asset rundown are due to these expenses. 
Understanding the rise in medical costs 
before death
Perhaps the most striking result we have shown 
is the sharp rise in medical expenses immediately 
preceding death. Although virtually all elderly indi-
viduals are covered by Medicare, there are gaping 
holes in Medicare coverage. Until the start of 2006, 
Medicare did not pay for prescription drugs. Medicare 
enrollees pay a 20 percent co-pay for doctor visits. 
Perhaps most importantly, Medicare puts caps on the 
number of hospital and nursing home nights that it 
covers per year. Medicare covers 100 percent of nurs-
ing home costs for only 20 days per year and only 
pays part of the cost of the next 80 days. Therefore, 
an individual who is in a nursing home for 365 days 
in a year will have to pay the full cost of the nursing 
home for 265 days out of the year, unless he or she 
has long-term care insurance or is financially desti-
tute and eligible for Medicaid. French and Kamboj 
(2002) and French and Jones (2004) provide addi-
tional details about the medical expense data.  
Figure 4 shows some of the subcomponents of 
health-related expenses, as well as the time spent  
using various health care services. In this figure, we  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FiguRE 
Annual health-related expenses and usage, those who die
Notes:	Out-of-pocket	expenses	include	those	for	doctor	visits	and	nights	spent	in	a	hospital	and	nursing	home.		
For	panels	D,	E,	and	F,	data	for	time	T	are	not	yet	available.
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FiguRE 
Annual consumption, those who die vs.
those who do not
Note:	Data	for	time	T	are	not	yet	available.
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	data	from		










Those who do not die
Those who die
divided the medical expenses into prescription drug 
costs, insurance premiums, and other out-of-pocket 
expenses, such as co-pays and deductibles for doctor 
visits and hospital and nursing home stays. Figure 4, 
panel A shows average out-of-pocket expenses for doc-
tor visits and hospital and nursing home stays, which 
rise from $1,600 at time T – 2 to $1,700 at time T – 1 
and $6,000 at time T. Figure 4, panel B shows drug 
expenses, which also rise before death, although not 
nearly as much as out-of-pocket expenses. Drug costs 
rise from about $500 at time T – 2 to $700 at time  
T – 1 and $800 at time T. Figure 4, panel C shows 
premiums for private health insurance (for example, 
“Medigap” coverage) and long-term care insurance, 
along with co-pays for Medicare part B insurance.  
Insurance premiums are approximately $700 at time 
T – 2 and $600 at time T – 1 and then fall to around 
$500 at time T. In short, the main expenditure change 
immediately before death is a sharp rise in out-of-
pocket expenses associated with doctor visits and 
hospital and nursing home stays.
Further, figure 4 shows the rise in doctor visits, 
as well as nights spent in a hospital and in a nursing 
home. Unfortunately, we have not yet coded these 
variables at time T. However, panels D, E, and F of 
figure 4 show that all these utilization measures rise 
as individuals near death.
Figure 5 shows consumption before death, as well 
as consumption by those who do not die. As described 
in the empirical methodology section (and in appendix 
B), we infer consumption by using the asset accumu-
lation equation. In order to infer consumption at a point 
in time, we need assets at two time periods. There-
fore, because we only have assets over three periods, 
we can only infer consumption for two points in time. 
Figure 5 shows that consumption of those who die is 
much larger than for those who do not. Consumption 
rises from $25,000 at time T – 2 to $33,000 at time  
T – 1. For those who do not die, consumption rises 
from $13,000 to $15,000. 
There are several potential explanations for the 
high level of inferred consumption right before death. 
a)  Individuals foresee the time of their death and 
run down their assets to enjoy higher consump-
tion before death.
b)  There is imprecise measurement. For example, 
there are many health-related expenditures (for 
instance, easy lifts that carry people up stairs) 
that are not included in our measure of medical 
expenditures.
c)  There are large inter vivos transfers right before 
death. For example, Kopczuk (2005) compares 
individuals who die after short illnesses against 
those who die after lengthy illnesses. He finds 
that for those who die after lengthy illnesses, 
there are sizable declines in estates and sizable 
increases in gift giving immediately preceding 
their deaths. As we noted in our discussion of 
equation 2, these transfers would be included in 
our measure of consumption.
Conclusion
A key implication of the basic life-cycle model  
is that assets are run down as individuals near death. 
Using data from the Asset and Health Dynamics of 
the Oldest Old, we present new evidence on asset 
rundown immediately before death. 
We find that the assets of people who die decline 
much more quickly than those of people who survive. 
In single-person households, average wealth declines 
by 30 percent in the (roughly) one year preceding 
death and by 50 percent in the (roughly) three years 
preceding death. In contrast, the assets of comparable 
survivors are essentially flat over the same period.
We also find that death is often preceded by a 
costly illness. Out-of-pocket medical expenditures re-
lated to increased drug costs, doctor visits, and hospital 
and nursing home stays go up by about 200 percent in 
the few years before death. The increase in medical 11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
spending before death, combined with burial expenses, 
can explain about 24 percent of the decline in assets 
of the soon-to-be deceased, and about 37 percent of 
the decline in assets in the last year of life. Our results 
NOTES
1See table 11 of Wolff (2004). Estimates are based on the 2001 
Survey of Consumer Finances published by the Employee Benefit 
Research Institute.
2Recent surveys include Browning and Crossley (2001) and Carroll 
(2001). Altig et al. (2001) provide a good example of how the life-
cycle model can be used for policy experiments.
3For example, in a recent survey of millionaires by the Northern 
Trust Corporation (2006), “nine out of ten … households are con-
cerned that spiraling health care costs might affect their ability to 
enjoy retirement.”
4Of 6,047 households in the AHEAD, we drop 362 households be-
cause of these criteria. We also drop 718 households whose heads 
were not retired, so our measure of income is clearer. We also drop 
560 households who left the sample for reasons other than death. 
This leaves us with 4,407 households. As noted previously, we also 
drop wave-one data, as they are suspect. Because 527 households 
have all members die by 1995, we are left with 3,880 households 
alive in 1995 for the main analysis. 
5We ignore taxes and assume that they are fairly minor.  This is not 
too unreasonable, given that social security benefits are untaxed (so 
long as total income is below a certain threshold).
6A similar econometric problem is that in a cross-sectional or short 
panel data set, we observe individuals who were born at different 
times: Older people were born in earlier years than younger people. 
Households from older cohorts have, on average, lower real life-
time earnings than households from younger cohorts. Thus, we 
would expect the asset levels of households in older cohorts to be 
lower than those of younger cohorts in any given year. Therefore, 
comparing older households with younger households leads the 
econometrician to overstate assets when young and to understate 
assets when old when looking at a particular year. In other words, 
this will potentially lead one to infer that individuals run down 
their assets near the end of their lives when this is not actually the 
case. See Shorrocks (1975).
APPENDIX A: THE ESTATE DATA
We use estate data from 1998 and 2000 in the analysis. 
In 1995 and 1998, respondents (usually spouses or chil-
dren of the deceased) were asked: “Altogether, what was 
the value of (his/her) total estate?” It is not totally clear 
whether respondents included the value of the house. 
However, in 2000, about half of respondents were asked 
the same question, and then in a later question were asked 
whether their previous answer had included the house. 
Most (but not all) responded that they were including 
the house. The remaining respondents in the year 2000 
interview were asked: “Excluding (his/her) home and 
any life insurance, altogether, what was the value of (his/
her) estate?” We make no attempt to add in the value of 
the house in the estate. Thus, we may be overstating as-
set declines at the time of death. We also assume that the 
value of the estate is net of all expenses related to death 
(the death expenses themselves are net of death insurance), 
but does not include life insurance.
For married couples, Hurd and Smith (2001) show 
that if one member of a couple dies, individuals are most 
likely interpreting “estate” to mean net of housing. To ad-
dress this issue, we use reported assets when one member 
of a couple dies, as the surviving spouse usually gives 
both asset and estate information. We assume that when 
one member of a couple dies, no money goes to children 
or other individuals.
A second important issue is nonresponse. This is a 
particularly important issue for estates. About 55 percent 
of all estate values are actual reports. The other 45 per-
cent are imputations made by the AHEAD. Many of the 
imputations use “unfolding brackets,” where the respon-
dents (usually children or spouses of the deceased) state 
that the estate of the deceased was worth more than some 
amount and less than another (for example, between 
$100,000 and $500,000). However, many of the estates 
are merely calculated using a hot-deck procedure that 
uses very little information. Thus, estates are likely mea-
sured with considerable error. Moreover, the 2002 data do 
not include any imputations at all and are thus excluded 
from the main analysis.
A third issue is that it is not clear whether the report-
ed estate values are net of any estate taxes. 
A final issue is that for some variables, such as death 
expenses, many people do not report a value. We set these 
values to zero, and thus, we likely understate death ex-
penses of these households. 
thus suggest that end-of-life expenditures, medical 
and otherwise, provide an important reason for elder-
ly households to retain their assets into very old age.1 3Q/006, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIX B: CONSUMPTION INFERENCE
As mentioned in the main text, although the AHEAD’s 
measure of consumption is poor, we can use equation 2 
in the text to estimate consumption. Consider an individ-
ual who died between survey years t – 1 and t. For this 
individual, anywhere from zero to three years may have 
elapsed between the survey interview at time t – 1 and 
the time of death. For the purpose of this exercise, we 
assume that exactly one year passes between survey year 
t – 1 and the time of death, which allows us to use equa-
tion 2 exactly as it is formulated in the main text.
Imputing the consumption that occurred between 
one period and two periods prior to death is a bit trickier. 
Anywhere between two years and three years may have 
elapsed between these two survey waves. In this in-
stance, we assume that exactly three years pass between 
interviews. This introduces compounded returns into our 
equation, yielding:
Cit− = − + + − − − −
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Death expenses and insurance payouts are omitted, 
as the person has not yet died.
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